1. Altruism, Cooperation, Generosity
  • One of the key questions in evolutionary biology and psychology is why individuals help strangers without the possibility of return (Batson et a. 2003, Bowles and Gintis 2004, Gintis et al. 2003, Fehr and Rockenbach 2004). Several scholars raised the idea that during most stages of human evolution humans evolved in small groups with frequently repeated interactions and reputation-building mechanisms (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003, Johnson et al., 2003). Individual selection can favour cooperative strategies directed towards recipients that have helped others in the past.
  • The effect of reputation-building on cooperation with group members has recently been examined by computer simulations and experimental games (Barclay 2004, Fehr and Fischbacher 2003, Milinski et al 2002a, Wedekind and Milinski  2000). In these experiments participants played various games such as reciprocity, trust and public goods games. These investigations, based on experimental games, can obviously provide “naturalistic” conditions for examining several crucial values like cost and benefit of an altruistic act, processes leading to reputation, the role of punishment in enforcing cooperation, etc.
  • However, while experimental games clearly examine the “logic” of cooperative transaction, they have certain limitations. Laboratory experiments recruit subjects who are completely unfamiliar with each other when entering the game. Unfamiliarity and anonimity, however, are usually unrealistic in human groups, where individuals have certain knowledge about the others’ attitudes, behavior, personality, and this knowledge deeply influences their decision to cooperate. Experimental games sometimes create artificial circumstances that people do not encounter in real situations. Furthermore, many important aspects of social circumstances and personality traits could not be investigated appropriately under these experimental designs.
  • Therefore, we have designed an experiment that reflects a realistic situation. The participants of the experiment did not take part in solving one or more tasks in an experimental game but they were induced to respond to an everyday problem while staying within the framework of their own life. A representative of a charity organization requested students of a seminar group to support people in need (lone, elderly, homeless and mentally retarded people).  In one setting they could make their offers publicly in the presence of their group mates (public group), while in another setting the offers were concealed, so the others in the group were not aware of them (anonymous group). Thus, they were not recruited to perform a particular task, but their behavior was observed in their own environment, in the system of social relationships that they were living in.
  • In one of our experiments (Bereczkei et al. 2007) we show that more subjects were willing to give assistance to unfamiliar people in need if they could make their charity offers in the presence of their group mates than in a situation when the offers remained concealed from the others. In return, those who were willing to participate in a particular charity activity received a significantly higher score on the scales measuring sympathy and trustworthiness than the others. Finally, a multiple regression analysis revealed that while several personality and behavior traits (cooperative ability, Machiavellianism, sensitivity to norms, sex) play a role in the development of prosocial behavior, the possibility of gaining reputation within the group remains a measurable causal factor of charity support.
  • In the second study, the costly signaling model is used to examine reputation-building as a result of charity offers to strangers (Birkas et al. 2006, Bereczkei et al. in press). This theory states that individuals who engage in altruistic acts serve their own interests by reliably demonstrating qualities underlying the altruistic act. This act may be useful for the group members in future social interactions, such as forming friendships, alliances, or getting mates in a way that provides a net benefit to the altruist Our results showed that significantly more subjects are willing to give assistance if they can make charity offers in the presence of their group members than when the offers are kept secret. In accordance with the costly signaling theory, the likelihood of charity service was strongly influenced by the expected cost of altruistic behavior. Subjects made more costly offers in public groups, while there was a roughly equal chance of making more and less costly offers in anonymous groups. Subjects who were willing to participate in a particular charity activity gained significantly higher reputation scores, measured on a sociometry scale, than others did. The cost of charity correlated with reputation building in the case of charity act judged as the most expensive (giving assistance to mentally retarded children), but not in the other categories of charity offer.
  • In the third study, the effect of the others’ presence on decisions to engage in helping behavior was examined. Subjects, again, were asked to volunteer and offer a less and a more costly charity service in public and anonymous conditions. We found that subjects’ willingness to offer help increased when group mates were directly informed of each other’s decisions. Empathy showed a relative independence of situational factors; ssubjects with higher scores of empathy were more likely to engage in helping activities than those of low empathy, regardless of whether they offered help on public or anonymous conditions and what the perceived degree of cost of altruistic behavior was. Machiavellianism, in contrast, proved to be strongly dependent on the presence of others and the cost of the offered charity act. High-Mach persons were likely to refuse help when the others did not observe them but more willing to give assistance – especially less costly help - if their prosocial behavior occurred with the knowledge of the others. This responsiveness to the strategic distinction between the presence and absence of others can be also explained in terms of reputation-gaining and competitive altruism.
  • Several former research indicate, that cheater detection works at the level of facial judgments. Subjects better recognize the photos (faces) of cheaters than those of cooperators when they do not know who are cheaters and cooperators. Evaluation of partners’ trustworthiness is automatic and adaptive.  To avoid exploitation, people have to make rapid decisions about the intentions (cooperation or cheating) of the partner. Eyes are the most informative part of the face. Gaze direction of the target presumably affects judgments about perceived trustworthiness. 
  • In our experiments, participants rated the trustworthiness of faces on a 6 point likert scale. We used average faces (one male and one female) looking in 5 different directions (direct, left, right, up and down). The target faces appeared among several individual faces, which were also rated. Average faces with direct gaze were rated as most trustworthy. Down looking faces were judged as less trustworthy. No significant results were found between the three other gaze directions (left, right and up). The ratings were independent from gender of target and of subjects. Our results indicate, that trustworthiness decisions depend on several facial features, like gaze direction. Untrustworthy faces might look different from trustworthy faces, but this discrimination is not based only on universal, constant facial cues. 
  • A robust finding in the cross-cultural literature is that people are able to recognize faces from their own race easier than faces from other races. This is known as the own-race effect. The goal of the other experiment of us was twofold: 1) how race caracteristics affect trustworthiness decisions about the face; and 2) how  the prejudice could change the  percieved trustworthiness. To create target stimulus, we used 3 Caucasian face-identities, which differented on the level of trustworthiness. We collected these pictures from Oosterhof and Todorov’s (2008) FaceGen database. The faces differented on trustworthiness, but were derived from the same face identity. This means, all 3 faces have the same identity, they only differ in the degree of trustworthiness. Using FaceGen modeller, we transformed the original faces into African, Indian and Asian faces. Participants were asked to evaluate the level of trustworthiness each face on a 6 point Likert-scale. Afterwards, they completed the Bogardus social distance scale attached to each stimulus picture. 
  • Results showed that participants rate own-race faces more trustworthy comparing the faces from other race. On the other hand, within the same race characteristics, judgments were consistent with the level of trustworthiness of the original (Caucasian) faces. Participant’s prejudice correlated negatively with trustworthiness ratings. 
  • According to the data, the own-race effect has a significant role int eh evaluation of face trustworthiness. People found more trustworthy same race faces, compared to other race faces. On the other hand, subjects are able to detect differencies int he level of trustworthiness between faces with same race characteristics. Our findings about social distance suggest,that people tend to evaluate faces as not trustworthy to the same extent as they reject other races. 

Published articles:
  • Bereczkei T. és Tóth P. (2010) A korrupció mint a vetélkedés és együttműködés sajátos formája. In: Együttműködés – Versengeés. Szerk. Rab V. és Deák A.., Gondolat Kiadó, Bp. pp. 236-243.
  • Czibor Andrea és Bereczkei T. (2010) Ki nyeri meg a versenyt? Egy kompetitív játék tanulságai. In: Darwin öröksége és időszerűsége a pszichológiában (Szerk. Pléh Cs. és Bereczkei T.), Akadémia Kiadó, Budapest, pp. 165-182.
  • Bereczkei T., Birkas B., and Kerekes Zs. (2010) Altruism towards strangers in need: costly signaling in an industrial society. Evolution and Human Behavior 31, 95-103.
  • Bereczkei T. Evolúciós pszichológia. Osiris Kiadó, Bp., 2003.
  • Bereczkei T. (2007) Gének és személyiség. In: Vázlatok a személyiségről. a személyiség-lélektan alapvető irányzatainak tükrében (Szerk. Gyöngyösiné Kiss E. és Oláh A.) Új Mandátum Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 59-82. o.
  • Bereczkei, T., Birkas., and Kerekes Zs. (2007) Public charity offer as a proximate factor of evolved reputation building strategy: An experimental analysis of a real life situation. Evolution and Human Behavior 28: 277-284.
  • Bereczkei T., Birkás B. és Kerekes Zs. (2007)Önzetlenség idegenek iránt. Egy evolúciós model kísérleti ellenőrzése.Magyar Pszichológiai Szemle 62: 449-474.
  • Bereczkei T., Birkas, B., and Kerekes Zs. (2008) Altruism towards strangers in need; costly signaling in an industrial society. Evolution and Human Behavior (in Press)
  • Birkás B., Bereczkei T., Kerekes Zs. (2006) Generosity, reputation, and costly signaling: a preliminary study of altruism toward unfamiliar people. Journal of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology 4: 173-182.
  • Paal T. and Bereczkei T (2007). Adult theory of mind, Machiavellianism, and cooperation: the effect of mindreading on social relations. Personality and Individual Differences 43: 541-551.
  • Bereczkei T. (2008) Az erény természete. Evolúciós stratégiák az idegenek iránti önzetlenség hátterében. XVIII. Pszichológia Nagygyűlés, Nyíregyháza